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PART ONE - INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents an examination of the various methods 
by which the Commissioner of Inland Revenue may make an assessment, 
or amend an assessment, of a taxpayer's liability to tax under 
Income Tax Act 1976. It is not an analysis of the objection 
procedure, but is a commentary on (a) the legal and administrative 
bases upon which the Commissioner may make his assessment and (b) 
the position of a taxpayer who may wish to challenge the mechanics 
of that assessment. 
The paper first of all examines the legislative framework 
which not only governs the assessment process itself, but also 
makes for the provision of the particulars, under threat of /" / / / 
penalty, upon which the actual assessment is made: PART TWO. 
PARTS THREE, FOUR and FIVE examine the methods of 
assessment and the considerable onus on the taxpayer wishing to 
test his liability to tax, as assessed by the Commissioner. Since 
special provisions apply where a business controlled by 
non-residents appears to produce insufficient taxable income, 
assessments in such circumstances are considered separately in 
PART SIX. 
PART SEVEN concludes the examination by considering the 
evidential requirements pertaining to the Commissioner's 
assessment and the taxpayer's challenge of them in both objection 
nw llBRARY 
VICTORIA U~!!VrnSITY OF .. ,- . . ,,rr"~ 
I 
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and criminal proceedings. 
Conclusions reached in PART EIGHT relate to matters of 
evidence and the burden of proof, with a concluding suggestion 
for a less restrictive approach to the challenging of the 
Commissioner's discretion when assessing the amount~ which 
tax i ----------- - ---
The paper is presented on the basis of current 
legislative provisions. A comparative table of sections is 
inlcuded as Appendix A however, for ease of reference when 
reading cases decided under the former Land and Income Tax 
(Act 1954. The paper is also presented as a consideration of 
\ the bases upon which the New Zealand Inland Revenue Commissioner 
may assess tax (the paucity of reference within the relevant 
ases to authorities in other jurisdictions aside), in light of 
)
New Zealand statutory provisions and decisions of the 
New Zealand Courts, the former Taxation Board of Review 
(established under the Inland Revenue Department Amendment Act 
1960) and the Taxation Review Authority established under the 
Inland Revenue Department Act 1974. 
References to 'The Act! and Section references are 
references to the Income Tax Act 1976 unless otherwise indicated. 
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PART TWO - THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
1. Returns, Particulars and Penalties 
Every taxpayer is required to furnish to the 
Corrunissioner, in each year, a return of all the assessable 
income derived by him during the preceding year, together 
with such other particulars as may be prescribed. 1 This 
requirement extends to partners, co-trustees and joint 
2 adventurers , and to executors or administrators of deceased 
taxpayers in respect of income derived by a deceased taxpayer 
in his lifetime. 3 
The requirement to furnish such a return therefore 
falls on every person "chargeable with income tax", whether 
on his own account or as the agent of any other person or in 
the capacity of trustee, e xecutor or administrator. 4 
Pay-period taxpayers (with the exception of shearers) whose 
annual income does not exceed $11,500 and comprises only 
salary and wages, pensions for past services, National 
Superannuation or any combination of those types of income, 
are not required to furnish a return of income. For pay-period 
taxpayers , tax liability is determined by the PAYE deductions 
in the particular income year, unless a special or incorrect 
tax code has been used, or wrong tax deduct i ons have bee n 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
Sect ion 9 . 
Sect ion 10 . 
S~~2R wh i ch dea ls with i ncome of a dece ased taxpa yer 
whi ch i s not derived during his life but sub sequent ly a cc r ues i n the 
hands o f t he trustee of the deceas ed t a xpa ye r. 
4 . See "Ta xpayer", s 2 . 
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made, thereby necessitating a return. Such taxpayers may, 
however, submit a return in order to claim a tax refund as 
a result of claiming special exemptions and rebates. 5 
A trustee, however, must file a return whether or not 
6 any profit has arisen out of the trust fund, and where income 
is derived by two or more persons jointly, as trustees, such 
persons are jointly assessable on returns required under 
Section 10 and jointly and severally liable for the tax so 
assessed. 7 
Partners are required to make a joint return of the 
income of their partnership, detailing their shareholding in 
the firm and are further required to make separate returns 
of all income personally derived but not included in the 
. . t 8 Joint re urn. Similarly, a joint adventurer is assessed 
on the amount of his share in any joint income. 9 Where, 
however, a relative is employed by or in partnership with 
the taxpayer, the Commissioner has a discretionary power 
to allocate the profits or income, for tax purposes, between 
the parties to the contract or between the partners, as he 
considers reasonable. 10 
In cases o f agency , a retu rn purport i ng to be made 
5 . See ss 356- 359 and Income Tax Act 1976, Part IV, relat i ng to Income Tax 
under wh i ch a pa y - period taxpayer filing a return is a s ses s ed . 
6 . Sections 22 7- 230 . 
7. Section 10 (1) (a ) . 
8 . Section 10 (1 ) (b) . In the case of pa rtner s t here is no join t assessmen t . 
9 . Section 10 (1) (c) . 
10 . Section 97 . 
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by or on behalf of any person is deemed to have been made by 
that person or by his authority, unless the contrary is 
11 proved. This presumption is obviously intended to avoid 
the difficulties the Department of Inland Revenue may face 
· · · · 1 12 h b h in proving agency in particu ar cases. Furt ermore, ot 
principal and agent may be liable if a false return is made. 13 
Special cases of agency are provided for in Part VII of the 
Act which sets out the provisions for the taxation of agents 
and non-residents (including absentees) . 14 Under Section 12 
however, the Commissioner may require special returns from 
agents, as well as from non-resident traders and other persons 
appearing to cease trading, or whom, i n a representative 
capacity otherwise appear unlikely to furnish returns in tte 
usual way. In such cases the Commissioner, in default of 
returns requested, or where he i s disatisfied with returns 
made, may assess the taxpayer on such a sum as he thinks 
15 reasonable. 
In addition to the foregoing returns, every person, 
whether a taxpayer or not, shall make to the Commissioner 
such annual returns as may be "prescribed" for the purposes 
16 of the Act. Examples of such prescribed returns may be seen 
in Sections 239 and 429-432. However, under the broader 
provisions of Section 14 the Commissioner may require any 
11. Section 18 . 
1 2 . See Maxwe ll v I nland Revenue Commissioner [1959] NZLR 708 . 
13. Se c tio n 41 6 (1 ) (e). 
1 4 . See I nc ome Tax Act 1976 Part VI I general ly , ss 27 4- 279 for s pecial 
c a ses . 
15 . Sees l 2 (1 ), (2) . 
16 . Sect ion 1 3 . 
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further or other returns for the purposes of the Act, again 
from any person whether a taxpayer or not. Under the latter 
section the Commissioner must "require" such further returns, 
presumably by express notice, from the person or persons 
concerned, while under Section 13 the Commissioner must 
"prescribe" any other required annual return pursuant to the 
provisions of that section. 
Balance dates and dates for returns are set out at 
Sections 15-17 of the Act. Further, Section 17A of the 
Inland Revenue Department Act 1974 specifies that annual 
returns of taxpayers shall be deemed not to have been fur-
nished until they have been received at any office of the 
Department. 
Under Section 16 of the Inland Revenue Department 
Act 1974, the Commissioner or any officer of the Department 
he so authorises, has at all times full and free access to 
all lands, buildings and places, in order to inspect all books 
and documents relevant to the purpose of collecting tax or 
17 duty. The owner, manager or any employee (past or present) 
of any enterprise is required to give all reasonable assistance 
and to answer all proper questions relating to the investigation 
The Commissioner or officer may require oral or written 
compliance, and may also require a statutory declaration 
T-lting to matters arising out of the investigation. 18 
17. Section 16 (1 ) . 
18 . Section 16 (2 ). 
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Section 17 of the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974 
provides the Commissioner with the further power to require 
written information, and to require inspection of any books 
or documents "for any purpose relating to the administration 
19 or enforcement of any of the Inland Revenue Acts or for any 
purpose relating to the administration or enforcement of any 
matter arising from or connected with any other function 
lawfully conferred on the Commissioner. 1120 The power includes 
inspection of lists of shareholders of companies, capital 
contributions, dividend payments, balance sheets, profit and 
loss and other accounts, and statements of assets and 
1 . b'l't' 21 1a 1 1 1es. As under Section 16, the Commissioner may 
require particulars to be verified by statutory declaration 
th . 22 or o erw1se. 
To add weight to the powers the Commissioner has in 
respect of particulars and returns under the Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1974 and the Income Tax Act 1976, any failure 
to comply with the Commissioner's request under Section 17 
of the former Act shall render a defaulting taxpayer, or such 
person of whom the request has been made, liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding $25 for each day of 
default. Should the Commissioner or, upon his application, a 
District Court Judge, hold an inquiry "for the purpose of 
obtaining any information with respect to the liability of 
19. See Inland Revenue Department Act 1974, First Schedule, 
reproduced as Appendix B to this paper. 
20. Sections 17(1). See also the similar wording ins 16(1), n. 17 supra. 
The Commissioner's discretion under s 17 is broader in that it 
includes consideration of both administration and enforcenent of 
matters in connection with the Commissioner's lawful functions. 
21. Section 17 (2). 
22. Section 17 (5). 
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any person for any tax or duty under any of the Inland Revenue 
Acts or any information required for the purposes of the 
administration or enforcement of any of those Acts or for the 
purposes of carrying out any other function lawfully conferred 
on the Commissioner 1123 , then any person refusing or wilfully 
neglecting to appear, so refusing to take an oath as witness, 
or so refusing to answer questions relating to the subject-
matter of the inquiry, is liable on summary conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $1,000. 24 Section 20 of the Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1974 however, provides a limited degree of 
privilege for confidential communications (whether information, 
book or document) between legal practitioners and between 
legal practitioners and their clients. 
Under Section 416(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act 1976 
every person who refuses or fails to furnish any return or 
information as and when required by the Act or by regulations 
made thereunder or by the Commissioner, shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding $500. 25 Every person committing an offence 
against the Act for which no other penalty is prescribed shall 
be liable to a fine not e x ceedi ng $2,000. Such offences 
include those under paragraphs (b) to (e) of section 416 (1), 
i.e. wilfully or negligently making a false return or so 
providing false information relat i ng to one's own personal tax 
23 . Section s 18(1) and 19(1) . See a l so the similar wording in ss 16( 1 ) 
an d 17(1) , s upra nn. 17 and 20 . Not e the wider powe r s and 
j urisdiction upon a District Court i nqu iry . 
24 . Section s 18(9 ) and 19(3) . 
25. Sections 416(2 ) a nd 417 . 
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liability, or to the liability to taxation of any other 
person; acting in contravention of or without lawful 
justification or excuse, or failing to comply with the Act 
or regulations made thereunder; and aiding, abetting or 
inciting the commission of an offence. 
In cases of evasion, attempted evasion or default 
in performance of any duty imposed on a taxpayer by the Act, 
an assessment of penal tax may be made, by way of penalty for 
the offence, to such an amount not exceeding treble the amount 
26 of deficient tax. 
In light of the above provisions, the Commissioner 
not only has the power to establish the administrative 
framework enabling him to assess comprehensively the 
circumstances of taxpayers and to collate such information 
that may in turn provide for a particular basis of assessment, 
but he also has the penal provisions to assist him in that 
task. In relation to wage and salary earners a perusal of 
return forms over the years indicates a gradual refinement 
process (no doubt in the light of experience in assessing 
27 returns) and reveals also an adaptability to legislative 
h d 1 f 1 . . 1 d . . 28 c anges ma e as a resu to po itica ecisions. In the 
case of company returns the range o f annual r eturns and accounts 
26 . Sectio n 420 . 
27. E .g. Particu l ar s re l a t i n g to marriage a n d to spous e t ax codes , 
ef f ectively c lari fy ing t he q u es t ion s ofde j ure marri a g e and de f acto 
d e pe ndency , a n d the doubl e - claiming of deduction s , e x e mption s and 
rebates by b o t h spouses . 
28 . E . g . The young f ami ly and l ow income fami ly r e bate s i ntroduce d 
by the Inc ome Tax Amendme nt Ac t 1980 . 
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required indicate the extensive assessment process. An example 
of the Commissioner requiring returns which may in turn be 
used to adjust the assessment framework is the Commissioner's 
current requesting of employers to provide details of non 
taxable payments to employees - made in the form of a 
reimbursement or allowance for employment related expenses. 
The collation of the incidence and extent of such payments 
(the investigation arising out of and following on from the 
payment of a tax free travel allowance to Air New Zealand 
employees) may lead to future Q;'egislative amendment, making 
such payments taxable either in the hands of employees or by 
the employer at source, and may lead to a requirement for both 
employers and employees to specify such payments and receipts 
in annual, or other returns, as required by the Commissioner. 
In all circumstances, the onus of making and delivering 
returns of income and furnishing such other particulars as the 
Commissioner may require, rests firmly on the taxpayer, i.e. 
the person chargeable with tax. The providing of returns and 
other information is however, a natural pre-condition to the 
act of assessment. It is also, as will become apparent in 
considering the Commissioner's powers in relation to 
assessments, the first step in a process throughout which the 
taxpayer may find he has an increasingly heavy onus to bear. 
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2. Assessments and Determinations 
Pursuant to Section 19(1) of the Act, the Commissioner 
is required (mandatory) to make an assessment for every year, 
/\....,-'"", .. ,·'\/·-
and from time to time and at any time as may be necessary, 
of the amount on which tax is payable by each taxpayer, and 
the amount of that tax. Such an assessment is made on the 
basis of returns and from any other information in the 
possession of the Commissioner. 
Subject to Section 19(1), where a return shows or 
purports to show a loss incurred by the taxpayer in an 
income year, the Commissioner is required to determine the 
loss, either in accordance with the provisions of the Act 
for the calculation of assessable income, or, where the 
provisions of Section 22(4), apply in accordance with that 
b 
. 29 su section. Where a taxpayer claims to carry forward the 
whole or part of a loss the Commissioner is required to 
determine whether the loss may be carried forward and i f so, 
to what extent. In such circumstances losses incurred and 
carried forward are to be calculated pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 188 (providing for the setting off of losses 
against future profits) . 30 
h 1 . d. f 31 1 Were a tax payer c a i ms a ere it o tax ore ects 
29 . Sec tion 19 (2) . Section 22 (4) is discussed in Pa rt Six of this 
pa per, p o s t. 
30 . Sec tion 19(3) . 
31. Pu r suant t o any of ss 156A , 156B , l 56D-l56G . 
- 12 -
32 to convert a prescribed loss into a credit of tax, the 
Commissioner is required to determine whether the loss may 
be converted, and if so, to what extent a credit of tax is 
allowable in the income year. 33 
As indicated above, it is the statutory duty of the 
Commissioner to make such assessments and determinations. 34 
That duty is emphasised by ~ ho proefi s i ons o f Section 2~ which 
provide.,:)that where any person makes default in furnishing any 
return or if the Commissioner is not satisfied with the 
return made by any person, the Commissioner may make an 
assessment of the amount on which in his judgment tax ought 
to be levied, and of the amount of that tax. The section also 
empowers the Commissioner, if he has reason to suppose that 
any person, although he has not made a return, is a taxpayer, 
to make a default assessment. In cases of a default 
assessment the person subject to assessment is liable to pay 
the tax so assessed "save in so far as he establishes on 
objection that the assessment is excessive or that he is not 
chargeable with tax". 
Under Section 23 the Commissioner has the added 
discretion to make such alterations or additions, f rom time 
to time and at any time, to any a ssessment he has previously 
made notwithstanding that tax may alre ady hav e been assessed 
32 . Pur s uant t o s 74A ors 157A . 
33 . Section 19(4) . 
34 . See a l so TRA Cas e 4 (1980 ) 4 TRNZ 56 , 58 . 
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and paid. In cases o f tax evasion however, it appears 
that assessment would be made under Section 21 as a default 
assessment. 
The amendment of an assessment under Section 23 can 
only be made at the discretion of the Commissioner. The 
taxpayer cannot compel the Commissioner to reopen a file, 
nor use the section to recover tax already overpaid,or to 
bring about an objection out of time. Furthermore, the 
Commissioner is not estopped from any f urther exercise of his 
discretion under the section in relation to assessments 
previously amended. 35 On the other hand the Commissioner 
cannot use the section to extend the grounds upon which 
liability has been imposed by means of an earlier amended 
assessment. 36 
In the case of an objection to a reassessment under 
Section 23 however, the burden of proo f , as in Section 21, 
lies on the taxpayer. 37 
An assessment may not be altered so as to increase 
the liability previously assessed after four years from the 
end of the year in which the assessment was made. 38 Howeve r 
where the Commissioner i s o f the opinion that returns hav e 
35. Union St e am Ship Co of NZ Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1962] 
NZLR 656 . 
36 . TRA Case 1 3 (1978 ) 3 TRNZ 179 , 186 . 
37 . Babingto n v Commis s i oner of Inland Revenue [1957] NZLR 861, 866 . 
38 . Section 25 (1). For express excepti o ns from the four year r ule see 
Butte rwor ths Ta xat ion Library Vol . 1 P . 1078 . 
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been fraudulently made, are wilfully misleading, or have 
omitted all mention of income which is of a particular nature 
or was derived from a particular source (and in respect of 
which a return was required to be made), the assessment may 
be altered at any time so as to increase the amount previously 
assessed. 39 Income referred to in Section 25 bears its 
ordinary meaning and is not limited by categories of assessable 
. . S t. 65 40 income in ec ion . Further, the maxim "de minimus non 
curat lex" may operate to e x cuse comparatively small omissions 
f 
. 41 o income. 
Section 26 provides that the validity of an assessment 
shall not be affected by the reason that any of the provisions 
of the Act have not been complied with, while Section 29(6) 
specifically provides that the omission to give notices of 
assessment and determinations required by Section 29 shall no t 
invalidate any assessment or determination, or in any manner 
affect the actual operation of such an assessment or 
determination . 
Further, except in proceedings on objection to an 
42 assessment, no assessment made by the Commissioner shall 
be disputed in any Court or in any proceeding s (including 
those before a Tax ation Review Authority ) either on the 
39 . Section 25(2) . 
40 . E . g . Sleeman v Commissioner of I nland Revenue [1 965] NZLR 647; Public 
Trustee v Commissioner of Inland Revenu e [ 196 1] NZLR 103 4. 
41. Babingto n v Commi ssion e r o f Inland Revenu e Supra n . 34, 869 . 
4 2 . See Part III of the Act for p r ovisions r e l a ting t o obj ec t i o ns 
t o asse ssme nts . 
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ground that the person so assessed is not a taxpayer or on 
any other ground. Except in objection proceedings then, 
every assessment and all the particulars thereof shall be 
conclusively deemed and taken to be correct, and the liability 
of the person so assessed is determined accordingly. 43 
Pursuant to s 19(5) of the Act, Sections 22 to 28 and Part III 
of the Act apply with respect to determinations. Therefore 
provisions relating to validity of assessments and the 
deeming of an assessment to be correct, similarly apply in 
respect of determinations. 
An undisputed assessment or determination is not 
conclusive against the taxpayer, however, upon prosecution 
d th ff . . f h 44 h un er e o ence provisions o t e Act. In sue 
circumstances, because the burden of proof is on the 
Commissioner, the taxpayer may challenge the Commissioner ' s 
assessment, including his opinion that returns were 
fraudulently made or were wilfully misleading for the 
45 purposes of Section 25(2). On the other hand, but subject 
to the judicial prohibition o f the Commissioner ex tending 
the grounds of liability established in an earlier re-
46 assessment, an a ssessment is not conclus ive against 
the Cornrnissioner.47 As outlined abov e, he may amend assessments 
pursuant to Sections 21 and 23 , s u b j ect to t he provisions 
of Section 25. 
43 . Sect i on 27 . 
44 . E . g . Maxwel l v Corruni ssioner of Inl and Revenue s upra n. 12. See 
also Part Seve nof this paper , post . 
45. Macfarl a n e v Corruniss i oner of Taxa tion (1923 ] NZLR 801 , 836 , 
CA (Sa l mond J . ) . 
46. See n . 36 , supr a . 
47 . Supra n . 45 . 
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There is, however, no definition of "assessment'' in 
the Act. An assessment cannot be equated with the notice 
received under Section 29. In R v Deputy Federal Commissioner 
f t . 48 .d49 o Taxa ion, Ex parte Hooper Isaacs J sai 
... "an assessment" is not a piece of paper, it is an 
official act or operation; it is the Commissioner's 
ascertainment, on consideration of all relevant 
circumstances, including sometimes his own opinion, 
of the amount of tax chargeable to a given taxpayer. 
Liability for tax is imposed by the various charging sections 
50 . 51 of the Act and not by the act of assessment itself. 
The first step of an assessment therefore involves a 
qualitative analysis and application of the legislative 
provisions and relevant taxation principles. The second 
step is then the quantification of the amount on which tax 
is payable and of the amount of that tax, i.e. the 
assessment is an evaluation of the applicability of the 
charging provisions of the Act and the quantification of that 
evaluation. The provisions giving the Commissioner power 
to make assessments and determinations are therefore the 
machinery provisions by which the process of e v aluation and 
quantification can be put into action. 
On receipt o f a tax payer's return, the Commissione r 
48 . (1926) 37 CLR 368 , HC. 
49 . Ibid , 373 . 
50 . Par t icul a rly s 38 . 
51. See El miger v Commissioner of I nland Revenue [1967 ) NZLR 161 . 
pursuant to Section 19, makes an assessment or determination 
on the basis of the return as filed, together with any other 
information he may have in his possession. Such other 
information would appear to encompass other returns required 
by the Commissioner, or enquiries made by him. 
No extensive investigation is undertaken at this 
stage, although adjustments may be made to a taxpayer's 
return by simply "adding back" assessable income where the 
~..k.,_ ~ u"\./J ~ 
Commissioner considers that certain claims cannot be 
------- 7 
permitted in light of the appropriate charging provisions, 
.~ 
or conversely, by "adding in'' all exemptions and rebates 
which may be claimed on the basis of the return, but which 
have not been so included by the taxpayer. This assessment 
is basically a qualitative evaluation of the details of the 
return as submitted and a quantitative check of the figures 
therein. 
In the absence of sufficient details, or in light of 
subsequent investigation by the Department, the Commissioner 
may make an assessment under Section 21 or Section 23 as 
appropriate. Again, this may involve a consideration of the 
applicability of the relevant charging provision, and in 
such circumstances may require the adding-back of various 
amounts into the original assessment of the return. Where, 
however, there is no available evidence against which amounts 
to be added-back can be assessed, then the 'add-back" procedure 
will involve an estimation of the amount on which the 
,, ~~ ~ '- r1 ~ a... ~ S') ~~ 
:Jn ··o -f. f..,,_ tWJdl.N ~ J) "'~ 
'I 
~, ~ ~1,"'/\ ~ r 
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Commissioner judges tax ought to be levied. As is more 
~
often the case there is some evidence available, either on 
a consideration of the taxpayer's own circumstances or on 
a comparison of the taxpayer with similar taxpayers in 
similar circumstances. In such cases the quantification 
of the amount upon which tax is assessed is arrived at by 
the assets accretion, peer group comparison, or gross 
percentage profit methods. 
In practice the Commissioner tends to use various 
combinations of these assessment methods. I n the case of 
businesses that are controlled by non-residents and 
appearing to produce insufficient taxable income however, 
the Commissioner makes an assessment or determination pursuant 
to Section 22, considered in Part Six of this Paper. In al l 
cases a taxpayer may be assessed on a basis peculiar to 
his own circumstances or by agreement with the Commissioner 
as to the amount on which he should be taxed. 52 
The Commissioner is required to make an assessment 
of every tax payer for every year and has the discretion to 
re-open assessments (subject to Section 25). Where the 
relevant charging sections of the Act do not assist in t he 
process of quanti fyi ng a tax pay e i s li ability to tax , the 
Commissioner has complete d i scretion as to what method he 
chooses in arriv ing at a n ass e ssment, a lthough i n making 
his assessment he must act bona fide. 53 The onus is on the 
52 . The agr eement i t self wou ld be the assessmen t , providing it was 
accep t ed as determining the taxpayer ' s liabil i t y to tax a nd was 
not mere l y an agreement as to t he proposed treatme nt of liabili t y 
p r ior t o t he s ubmission of statutor y re turns. 
53 . Babington v Commissioner of Inla~d Revenue s up r a n. 37, 865 . 
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taxpayer not only to furnish returns and other particulars, 
but also to show that the Commissioner is wrong in making 
his assessment, and to what extent. 
The Legislative framework, therefore, is designed to 
assist the Commissioner in the collection of taxes. In 
submitting his returns then, the taxpayer in light of the 
Legislative provisions discussed above, is obliged to furnish 
all such information as required of him and then to accept, 
except in the case of objection, the Commissioner's 
assessment. Even on objection the onus is upon the taxpayer. 
"There is no equity about a tax. 1154 
3. Ancillary Taxes 
Under the Income Tax Act 1976, the Commissioner may 
make assessments of ancillary taxes such as bonus issue tax, 
excess retention tax, withdrawal tax, and as outlined above, 
penal tax. Assessments under Sections 262 (bonus issue tax) 
and 334 (withdrawal tax) are made subect to Sections 23 and 
26-29 of the Act, while assessments made under Sections 252 
(excess retention tax) and 420 (penal tax) are made according 
to the provisions therein. 
54. Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue (1921] 1 KB 64, 71, in discussing the interpretation of 
taxing statutes. 
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PART THREE ADD-BACK METHOD 
1. Adding-back as a procedural requirement 
55 As alluded to in Part Two of this paper, where an 
adjustment is made to a return merely by including or 
excluding items, this "add-back'' process cannot be regarded 
as an administrative method of assessment, but rather as a 
procedural step required by the relevant statutory provisions 
imposing the liability to tax. In such circumstances the 
assessment is arrived at by an evaluation of the applicability 
of those provisions, and the addition to or the subtraction 
from the return of the amount as declared by the taxpayer or 
th d b h . . 56 e amount as assesse y t e Cornrn1ss1oner. 
2. Adding-back as a quantifying process 
Where the Commissioner considers that records are 
insufficient or that a return is not satisfactory for the 
purposes of assessment, or considers that previous 
assessments, in the light of information gained in the course 
of his investigations, are incorrect, he may have recourse 
to the add-back method in the absence of evidence otherwise 
accounting for a taxpayer's income and expenditure. 
By this method, an amount representing living expenses, 
and all other known expenditure and deposits accounted for, is 
55. 
56. 
See Assessments and Determinations, P- ~ ·q' 
E.g. Macfarlane & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue supra n.45 
(valuation of livestock); Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [197 0 ] NZLR 321 (deduction for expenditure 
incurred in course of producing assessable income); TRA Case 17 
(1975) 1 TRNZ 247 (Loss on farming "business"). 
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deducted from moneys available to the taxpayer. The 
resultant figure is then added as assessable income and any 
moneys not declared are added back into income. The method 
therefore, is used where the Commissioner considers that 
unexplained deposits should be treated as income, particularly 
where he considers that such deposits have arisen out of 
suppressed sales or other undeclared income. 57 
The add-back method may involve an estimation of 
income alone where the taxpayer's expenditure is known. More 
likely, and usually concurrently, the Commissioner will make 
his own calculation of living expenses and other expenditure. 
The method may be regarded as having been approved 
by the courts, the former Board of Review and the Taxation 
Review Authority in their acceptance of the principle in the 
dictum of Turner J. in Babington v Commissioner of Inland 
58 Revenue. 
In making his original assessment of the amount upon which tax 
ought to be levied, and in making such alterations thereto as 
he later thought necessary, the respondent was not, in my 
opinion, limited to any particular method of assessment and, 
provided that he proceeded bona fide to assess the amount upon 
which, in his judgrnent, tax ought to be levied, I think that his 
assessment must stand, save only in so far as the appellant 
establishes his objection that the amount is excessive.
59 
57. This is especially the case where depos·ts (or excessive expenditure in 
the absence of accountable income) een explained away by the 
? 
taxpayer as arising out of casual gambling winnings (or losses) E.g. 
Case 57 (1963) 1 NZTBR 424; Case 25 (1964) 2 NZTBR 199, 204- 205; 
Case 31 (1969) 4 NZTBR 341, 355-356. When deposits are so accounted 
for, the Commissioner cannot then argue that in order to obtain such 
winnings (and logically to make losses) the taxpayer must have used an 
identical amount out of otherwise assessable funds and that the base 
wagering figure should accordingly be added back: Case 31, n supra. 
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Although Turner Jin Babington's case was 
considering the assets accretion method, his dictum clearly 
goes beyond that particular method. The Commissioner is not 
limited to any particular method providing he acts bona fide 
in assessing the amount upon which, in his judgment, tax 
ought to be levied. 
7 
As a result, the Commissioner has complete discretion 
when using the add-back method when assessing both income 
d 1 . . F 1 . TRA Case 15 6 0 ( h an 1v1ng expenses. or examp e, in_______ were 
a "cash available" statement was produced to verify the 
acceptability of an assessment based on the accretion of 
assets), the taxpayer's income was re-assessed by taking the 
known income in a particular year and calculating income for 
the prior nine years on the basis of the cost of living index. 
In TRA Case 17 61 the Commissioner added-back an amount he 
deemed to represent the income received by a taxpayer from 
illegal activities. In that case the Commissioner, in 
reliance on the conviction of the taxpayer for selling heroin, 
included as assessable income a substantial refund otherwise 
due to the taxpayer. As the Commissioner had not acted in 
bad faith and the taxpayer had not shown the assessment to 
be wrong, the assessment was upheld. 
Since the add-back method of quantifying income 
58 . Sup r a n. 37 ; 865 . 
59. See als o Case 25 supr a n . 57 ; 205 whe r e Babington' s cas e was 
r eferred to. 
60 . (1977) 2 TRNZ 294 . 
61. (1980 ) 4 TRNZ 173 . 
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requires the Commissioner to make a calculation of the amount 
deemed to have been derived during the income year (or 
income years under investigation), as in the case of an 
assessment under the assets accretion method (and logically 
under other methods of quantification) the Commissioner's 
assessment may disclose income for a year which is not in 
truth the real income for that year. 62 The assessment of 
income is not conclusive as to actual living or private 
expenses even for the years to which the assessment 
specifically relates. 63 The resultant assessment of the 
amount upon which tax is payable is, however, conclusiv e 
against the taxpayer as outlined in Part One of this paper, 
and it is up to the taxpayer, on objection, to show that the 
amount is excessive. In doing so, the taxpayer may produce 
evidence to question the amount of his expenditure or to show 
that certain income was not derived by him. In the f inal 
analysis however, he must show that the amount upon which the 
Commissioner has assessed his liability to tax i s wrong, and 
64 by how much. 
An assessment of liv ing expenses and other expenditure 
will often involve a comparison of the taxpayer with similar 
taxpayers in lik e circumstances or o f like disposit i on. 
Furthermore, there is usually some e v idence to which the 
62 . E . g . Ca se 24 (1962 ) 1 NZTBR 1 74 , 181-183 referring t o Ph i llips v 
Commiss i on e r of Inla nd Revenue (1959 ] NZLR 1357; (1959) 8 AIT~ 21. 
Ph i llips c a se a nd the a ssets accret ion me t hod are discussed i n 
Pa r t Four of this p aper . 
63 . Ca s e 18 (1966) 3 NZTBR 217 , 225 . 
64 . Babing t o n v Commiss i on er of Inla nd Revenue s up ra n . 37 ; 
Commissioner of Taxes (N . Z . ) v Mc coa rd (1952) NZLR 263 ; (1952) 
5 AITR 323 . 
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Commissioner may refer in calculating a taxpayer's 
assessable income, even in the case of regular salary and 
wage earners. Such evidence will usually be provided by 
a consideration of the taxpayer's assets or use of a method 
of calculation peculiar to the taxpayer's affairs 
(particularly when considering the gross percentage profit 
that may be expected of a taxpayer in business). As a result, 
the add-back method has limited applicability as an 
independent administrative method. Generally it can be 
expected to be used to corroborate the acceptability of an 
65 assessment reached by other methods. 
t) r-
- /~ 
-1 }~) , 
65. E.g. Case 24 supra n.61 and TRA Case 15 supra n . 60 - assets 
accretion and peer group comparison methods; Case 31 supra n.57 -
assets accretion and gross percentage profit methcds; Case 18 
supra n.63 - assets accretion method. 
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PART FOUR ASSETS ACCRETION METHOD 
The most commonly used method in the absence of records 
or where the Commissioner considers a taxpayer's return is not 
correct, is the assets accretion method. It has been summarised 
by Wilson J. in Glaussius v Inland Revenue Commissioner (N.z.) 66 
as follows: 67 
This is a statement of the ascertained assets of the taxpayer at 
the commencement and at the end of each fiscal year under review 
(valued at cost) and his sundry debtors, from which is deducted 
all known liabilities of a capital nature, sundry creditors 
existing at the end of the year and all moneys received by the 
taxpayer during the year from non-assessable sources. To the 
difference is added all known expenditure by the taxpayer for 
purposes other than the acquisition of the assets already taken 
into account, including living expenses. The final result should 
show the money which the taxpayer had received during the year 
from assessable sources. 
In the same case, Wilson J., noting that the assets 
accretion method had "no express authority'', examined the basis 
upon which use of the method had received recognition and gained 
approval by th@urt in New Zealana.
68 
The first reported case in which its use was considered was 
Babington v Commissioner of Taxes (N.Z.) [1957) NZLR 861 at p. 865; 
6 AITR, 428, at pp. 432-3, in which Turner J. said "In making his 
original assessment of the amount upon which tax ought to be levied, 
and in making such alterations thereto as he later thought necessary, 
the respondent was not, in my opinion, limited to any particular method 
of assessment, and, provided that he proceeded bona fide to assess 
the amount upon which, in his judgment, tax ought to be levied, I think 
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that his assessment must stand, save only in so far as the appellant 
establishes his objection that the amount is excessive. Trautwein's 
case [Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1936) 56 CLR 63) 
cited by the appellant, appears to be an authority completely 
supporting this statement of which I conceive to be the law. It may 
well be that the use of the 'assets method', in the absence of 
objection, may result in only a crude approximation to the true 
amount of the assessable income: but though crude, this may approach 
accuracy much more closely than the returns provided by a defaulting 
taxpayer. Thus, Sir John Latham, C.J. in Trautwein's case says: 'In 
the absence of some record in the mind or in the books of the taxpayer, 
it would often by quite impossible to make a correct assessment. The 
assessment would necessarily be a guess to some extent, and almost 
certainly inaccurate in fact. There is every reason to assume that 
the legislature did not intend to confer upon a potential taxpayer 
the valued privilege of disqualifying himself in that capacity by 
the simple and relatively unskilled method of losing either his 
memory or his books'." 
Wilson J. considered that since Babington's case, the 
right of the Commissioner to adopt the assets accretion method 
of assessing a taxpayer's income had not been in doubt. 69 He 
did note however, that in Hall v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 70 
he had held that the method was not sufficiently accurate in 
respect of any particular year to afford proof beyond reasonable 
doubt that a taxpayer's return of income for that year was 
wilfully false (on a prosecution under Section 228 (1) (b) of the 
Land and Income Tax Act 1954, now Section 416 (1) (b) of the 
Income Tax Act 1976) . 71 
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Wilson J. then traced challenges to the method. 72 In 
Phillips v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 73 Shorland J. held 
that where the statement prepared by the Commissioner referred 
to an asset of the taxpayer, the existence of which was denied 
on oath by the taxpayer, the onus is on the Commissioner to prove 
its existence as the property of the taxpayer and that the 
Commissioner, having assessed the taxpayer on the basis of the 
figures shown by an assets accretion statement, is not entitled 
to depart from those figures in any particular year merely 
because the result gives a lower income that that returned by the 
taxpayer. At 1358; 22, Shorland J. had said: 
The Commissioner cannot of course have it both ways. It is 
inherent in the "assets method" of deducing income that whereas 
it shows the income earned over the period to which it is applied, 
it cannot for certain and with absolute accuracy demonstrate the 
precise time when such income was earned. If the application of 
the "assets method" shows a lower figure than that which was in 
fact earned in a particular year, then it would presumably do so 
because it attributed part of the income in fact earned in that 
year to some other year; or, in other words, because it included 
an overstatement of the true income for some other year. 
In Fenson v Inland Revenue Commissioner 74 (N.Z.), 
Richmond J., in order to bring about a realistic result bearing 
in mind that the "increase in assets" basis is likely to result 
in errors in individual years, redistributed the deficiencies 
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and excesses in the investigating inspector's statement by 
allocating the sums involved unequally among the relevant years 
concerned. In Trautwein's case (referred to by Turner J. in 
Babington's case, supra) the Commissioner had no means of 
ascertaining in which of the seven years under review understated 
assessable income of Lll2,354 should be allocated. In the 
circumstances he apportioned it equally over the seven years 
having allocated, as far as possible, the income to the years 
in which it had been found to have been derived. 
In Glaussius' case, Wilson J. concluded: 75 
From these decisions the following principles may be extracted:-
(1) The assets accretion method is one which the Commissioner is 
entitled to apply in estimating the assessable income of a taxpayer for 
the purpose of assessing him to tax. 
(2) Provided the Commissioner employs this method bona fide 
for this purpose his assessment must stand save only in so far as 
the taxpayer establishes that the amount is excessive (Babington's 
case and Trautwein's case). 
(3) It is not sufficient for the taxpayer to establish that the 
assessable income for any particular year, ascertained by this method, 
is not correct. He must also show by how much it is wrong (Babington's 
case. See also Commissioner of Taxes (N.Z.) v Mccoard, [1952) NZLR 263; 
5 AITR 323). 
(4) The Commissioner may properly spread the value of an asset 
representing income derived by the taxpayer during the period covered 
by the assets accretion statement equally over each of those years if 
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if there is no satisfactory evidence to show the year or years in 
which it was in fact derived. If he does so the onus is on the 
taxpayer to prove in what year or years it was derived (Trautwein's 
case). 
(5) Spreading should be adopted in such a way as to produce a 
"realistic" result (Fenson's case). (By "realistic" I understand 
Richmond J. to mean "in accordance with the proved facts". In this 
sense I think that it merely states, in another way, the principle 
that the taxpayer is entitled to have assessments amended to the 
extent that he succeeds in proving them to be incorrect. If the 
reference to the necessity for achieving a "realistic result" was 
intended to bear a wider meaning than this I respectfully dissent 
from the proposition.) 
The assets accretion method then, is a method by which 
the net worth of assets acquired in any one year is added to an 
amount representing living and other personal expenditure, and 
the balance regarded as assessable income (allowing for income 
from non-assessable sources). It is a method whereby amounts 
expended in the purchase of assets and in living expenses is 
considered in relation to an amount deemed necessary to support 
such expenditure. The method is therefore used when a taxpayer's 
return may indicate a substantially smaller income than would be 
necessary to support outgoings, or when a taxpayer has not kept 
such books of account or records as would enable an investigator 
to trace the nature and extent of his income and expenditure. 76 
Since evidence relating to such amounts is likely to be 
available in respect of most taxpayers, it is logical that this 
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method is most commonly used in a default or amended 
77 assessment. As indicated by Turner J. in Babington's case 
78 and McCarthy J. in Maxwell's case , the assets method 
produces an "approximation" of the income required to be 
returned. Because the question!)of value of assets, income 
derived and living expenses, in particular, may be arguable 
points, the method cannot be regarded as exactly identifying 
the affairs of each tax payer. (See Shorland J. in Phillips 
case, supra.) 
Although Shorland J. in Phillips' case (supra) 
considered that the Commissioner must prove the existence 
of an asset that a taxpayer has denied on oath, such does not 
amount to a finding that, because the Commissioner finds himself 
compelled to make an estimate of a taxpayer's living or private 
expenses, he must necessarily relate every item of expenditure 
t . l 79 to a par icu ar asset. On the other hand, it would appear 
that the Commissioner must take account of assets owned by a 
taxpayer at any time during the period covered by the assets 
statement, if its being brought into account in any way 
would tend to show that the statement was erroneous to an 
80 ascertainable extent. 
Although the onus is on the taxpayer to show that the 
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Cormnissioner's assessment is wrong, it is reasonable to require 
of the Cormnissioner to present evidence of the existence of an 
asset included in his statement. It would appear, however, 
(although the matter has not been considered by the Court or 
Review Authority, that Shorland J. 's statement in Phillips' 
case is too strong. For the denial by a taxpayer of the existence 
of an asset, be it on oath, may place an unreasonable burden upon 
the Cormnissioner. In light of the onus on the taxpayer to show 
the Cormnissioner's assessment is wrong on the balance of 
probabilities, 81 it is logical to expect of the Cormnissioner to 
raise evidence which may be tested on the same basis. At 1359, 
Shorland J. said as follows: 
The onus is upon the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner's 
assessment is wrong; but whatever may be said about initial onus, 
I am of opinion that when the Commissioner seeks to apply the 
"assets method" of calculating a taxpayer's income, he must, in 
the final resort, undertake the burden of proving the existence 
of the asset which he claims the taxpayer has accumulated if the 
taxpayer's denial on oath of the ownership and existence of any 
such asset is to be displaced. 
In the circumstances, his viewpoint indicates something more 
than proof on the balance of probabilities. If that is so, then 
it would also be logical to expect of the Cormnissioner to produce 
affirmative, conclusive proof, of living and other expenditure. 
As the Cormnissioner's assessment is tested on the balance of 
81. Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Legarth (1969] NZLR 137; 
Duggan v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1973] NZLR 682; see 
also McCoard's case, supra n.64 and Babbington's case, supra 
n.37. See also Part Seven of this paper 
probabilities on objection, such a test should also apply to 
assertions as to the existence of assets. As Richardson J. noted 
. k 1 Y d C ' . f 1 d B lA in Bue ey & oung Lt v ommissioner o In an Revenue 
"[T]he Commissioner could not sensibly be expected to bear the 
onus of proof of matters that originate with the taxpayer and 
which usually are peculiarly within his knowledge and power."BlB 
It is also reasonable to expect the Commissioner to 
adhere to the results of an assessment based on an assets statement 
even where his figures for a particular year, within a period 
of years under investigation, may fall short of income declared 
by a taxpayer. If the Commissioner departs from the taxpayer's 
return and uses the assets method to arrive at an approximation 
of a taxpayer's income, then his assessment for a period of 
years at least should be used with consistency. Should he accept 
a taxpayer's declared income for a particular year then it should 
entail adjustment elsewhere in the statement for the period under 
investigation. This viewpoint would seem to underlie Shorland J. 's 
statement (supra) that such a disparity must point to the 
Commissioner's attributing part of the income in fact earned in 
that year to some other year; that the statement included an 
overstatement of the true income for some other year. On the 
other hand the taxpayer's figures may reflect his own 
understatement in other years. 
81A. [1978] 2 NZLR 485; (1978) 2 TRNZ 485, CA. 
81B. Ibid, 498; 500. 
In respect of an assessment for a single year in 
isolation, however, the Commissioner need not resort to his 
assessment based on the assets accretion method, if his taxable 
figure falls short of the taxpayer's. The Commissioner in such 
cases may use the taxpayer's figures to make an assessment in any 
case, or alternatively may decline to make an amended assessment. 
It is however, unlikely that this situation would often occur 
since such a finding would most likely lead the Commissioner 
to a deeper investigation of the taxpayer's affairs over the 
preceding years. 
When investigating a taxpayer over a number of years, it 
is also reasonable that the Commissioner should re-open the 
assessments of each year falling within the particular period. 
Assets may arise out of income sources carried over from previous 
years. Alternatively should the Commissioner make an amended 
assessment or a default assessment for a period of years in which 
no returns, or insufficient returns, have been submitted, he must 
allocate as far as possible the income that can be attributed 
to the year in which it is derived. For such purposes a 
consideration of a consecutive number of years is required. 
In Babington's case (supra) Turner J. made it clear that 
the assets method may result in only a crude approximation to the 
true amount of the assessable income but that such may approach 
accuracy much more closely than the returns provided by a 
defaulting taxpayer. In Trautwein's case identifiable income was 
allocated to the years in which it was derived and it was only 
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the balance then remaining which was divided equally over a 
82 period of seven years. Richmond J. in Fenson v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue had regard to a "realistic approach'' in 
redistributing understated income (unequally), although in that 
case no argument was addressed to the learned Judge upon the 
d . f h . 83 sprea ing o sue income. In Hall's case (noting that this 
was an appeal against convictions on charges of wilfully making 
false returns), Wilson J. considered that the appellant's 
return showed a much more credible pattern than the violent 
84 fluctuations in the Commissioner's assessment. It must 
therefore be assumed that the acceptability of that pattern 
out-weighed, for instance, the fact that results obtained by an 
application of the assets method sometimes will accord with 
the position which would have been disclosed had a taxpayer kept 
5 , (l/>, sufficient business records " - <l 
In Case 10, having reviewed the above cases, the 
Taxation Board of Review said: 86 
(T]he position may, we think, be summarised by saying that, in 
the few recorded instances where such a procedure has been 
followed, the Courts, while not laying claim to any statutory 
authority for what was being done, appear to have detected in 
the facts of the particular case under review some warrant for 
the course adopted. 
82. (1936) 56 CLR 63. See also supra, n.68. 
83. Supra, n.74. 
84. Supra, n.70. 
85. Case 10 (1965) 3 NZTBR 106, 126. 
86. Ibid, 127. 
The spreading of understated income then, will depend 
upon the facts of each case, but in light of a realistic and 
credible approach, it would seem imperative that each year 
within a period of years under investigation should be given 
consideration within the Commissioner's assessment. 
This viewpoint is supported by Shorland J. in Phillips' 
case in referring to "the unfairness which would result from 
permitting the Commissioner to reject the 'assets method'for a 
year within the period to which he has applied that method", 
and noting that in the circumstances "the Commissioner has 
rejected the appellant's returns and has set up in its place the 
'assets method' and submitted his schedule showing the bases 
upon which he claims that the several figures therein shown are 
the income earned by the appellant in the particular years 
specified 11 • 87 
Further (as argued above), in Case 11 88 the Taxation 
Board of Review considered that the Commissioner is not entitled 
to assume that income must have been expended when that income, 
or an asset produced by it, might well only become apparent in 
a later year. 
In other words, if while applying the assets method, additional 
income is at the same time calculated by another method, a taxpayer 
could well be assessed to tax upon that income in the year for 
which the calculation is made as well as in another year when an 
asset arising from such income becomes apparent. 
87. Supra, n.62; 1358. 
88. (1968) 4 NZTBR llJ, 127. 
The Board of Review in Case 11 in reaching its conclusions 
had noted that: 
The question so raise d doe s not appear to have been considere d in 
any of the judgments cited to us. We nevertheless do not overlook 
the fact that in Babington's case (supra), at p. 865, Turner J. 
said the respondent Commissioner was not, in the learned Judge's 
opinion, 'limited to any particular method of assessment' and 
further that provided 'he proceeded bona fide to assess the amount 
upon which, in his judgment, tax ought to be levied ... his assessment 
must stand, save only in so far as the appellant establishes his 
objection that the amount is excessive'. We do not, however, regard 
those words as justifying the use in the circumstances of t his case 
of the assets method and the 'mileage' method at one and the s ame . 89 time. 
It is therefore evident that the Commissioner must consider 
each year under investigation, and, as the Board commented in 
Case 11, the fact that the Commissioner's assessment may result 
in the reduction of a taxpayer's declared income in any particular 
90 year, is not of "material consequence''. As the Board had earlier 
noted (supra) inconsistency in the method of assessment may lead 
to an element of double taxation, and as Shorland J. had noted in 
Phillips' case, the Commissioner could not "have it both ways". 
91 In Lancaster v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
Moller J. summarised the taxpayer's argument as being that if a 
taxpayer produces, in connection with any point of dispute, 
89 . Ibid, 1 26-1 27 . 
90 . I bid, 1 28 . 
91. [1969) NZLR 589 . 
evidence that may possibly be the correct representation of the 
position under consideration, the onus then shifts to the 
Commissioner to show affirmatively that the representation is 
wrong, and that that presented by his (the Commissioner's) own 
'd . t 92 evi ence is correc . Moller J., in considering the onus upon 
93 the taxpayer, distinguished Phillips' case in the circumstances, 
and concluded: 
This [the taxpayer's submission], in my view, is contrary to all 
authority in such matters ... It is true that, in the course of a 
hearing before the Board of Review, the onus of proof, in one 
sense, may, from time to time, shift between the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner; but the onus of proof, in the sense in which it is 
used in s.20 [now Section 36 of the Inland Revenue Department 
Act 1974), still requires that the final question must always be: 
'On all the evidence, has the taxpayer discharged the onus of 
demonstrating that the Commissioner's assessment was wrong, and, 
if so, why it was wrong, and how far it is wrong?' This is what 
Turner J. in Babington v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1957) 
NZLR 861, called the 'considerable handicap explicitly laid upon 
94 him by the statute'. 
Moller J. in Lancaster's case was considering what 
is now Section 36 of the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974. 
That section relates to the grounds of objection on the hearing 
and determination of any objection, and further provides that 
"subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 423 
of the Income Tax Act 1976, the burden of proof shall be on the 
objector". In light of the discussion in Part Two of this paper 
relating to assessments and the authority of Babington's case 
in particular, 95 the onus is clearly on the taxpayer to show the 
92. Ibid, 590 . 
93. McCoard's case, supra n.64. 
94. Lancaster's case, supra n.91; 590-591. 
95. Supra, p.21. 
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actual assessment as made by the Commissioner, is wrong. He 
cannot merely produce alternative evidence that may indicate 
some other figure. As the Taxation Board of Review commented 
. C 596 1.n ase 
We do not overlook the use by Turner J. of the words 'in the 
absence of objection' in Babington's case; but we adopt the 
view that they mean simply that, while the correctness of 
assessments made by the assets method could be questioned, 
the time has long since passed when the validity of such 
method would be open to attack. 
kl d . . f 1 d 97 In Bue ey & Young Lt v Commissioner o In an Revenue 
however, Richardson J. in delivering the judgment of the Court, 
referred to Moller J. at 591 in Lancaster's case (supra) and 
concluded: 98 
The reason for this statutory onus is obvious enough. The Commissioner 
could not sensibly be expected to bear the onus of proof of matters 
which originate with the taxpayer and which usually are peculiarly 
within his knowledge and power. Thus, there are sound if not compelling 
practical reasons why the legislation requires him to provide 
satisfactory evidence to support his calculation of his assessable 
income. If he fails or is unable to provide sufficient evidence to 
discharge that onus, his objection to the Commissioner's assessment 
will fail. 
He then considered Evans Medical Supplies Ltd v Moriarty 99 
in which Viscount Simonds had remarked that in apportionment 
cases, the mere fact that an apportionment might be difficult 
would not of itself be reason for failing to provide an answer 
upon evidence proferred in support of it. Richardson J. then 
96 . (1961 ) 1 NZTBR 23 , 27 . 
9 7. Sup ra n. 8 1A. 
98. Ibid , 4 98 ; 500 . 
99 . (1 9 57) 37 TC 5 4 0 , 580 . 
100 concluded: 
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A fair balance must be maintained in this k ind of case. As Cooke J 
observed in Duggan v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1973) 1 NZLR 682, 
686, the onus of proof must be applied in a broad and commonsense way. 
So that in such an apportionment case as the present the taxpayer 
must be able to point to some intelligible basis upon which a positive 
finding can be made that a defined part of the total sum is deductible. 
Where the Commissioner has refused a deduction and his assessment is 
challenged, then the taxpayer must establish that the decision is 
wrong and the extent to which the assessment should be varied. That 
last matter does not require an answer of absolute precision or one 
that has been calculated by some kind of scientific process but, unless 
the taxpayer can demonstrate affirmatively that at least a minimum 
quantifiable sum is deductible, he will have failed to discharge the 
onus that for good practical reasons has been placed upon him by the 
legislature. 
In cases where apportionment of expenditure is permitted,io : 
failure to prove the Commissioner is wrong will not necessarily 
result in the standing of the full amount as assessed by the 
Commissioner. In such cases evidence of apportionment will 
accordingly reduce the assessment of income. In all other 
circumstances however, except to the extent the taxpayer can 
show the Commissioner is wrong (i.e., incorrect) and to what 0 \ 
extent, the taxpayer .,,c_gR~At lPHn Pvinence to indicate a different ·----~ ------- --~--
possible assessment. In light of the provisions of Sections 26 
and 27, in particular, and in light of the approach taken by the 
Board in Case 5 (supra), the validity of the assets accretion 
method itself cannot be called into question when used by the 
100 . Sup ra n. 8 1A; 498 ; 500 . 
101 . E. g . I ncome Tax Act 1976 , s 104 (formerly Land and I ncome Tax 
Ac t 1954 , s 111) . 
I 
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Commissioner. 
As Turner J. said in Babington's case, 102 such is the 
~onsiderable handicap' explicitly laid upon the taxpayer by 
G,atute. Arguments as to the Commissioner's duty to make an 
assessment for the purposes of the collection of tax aside, it 
would seem equitable that a taxpayer should be able to produce 
prima facie evidence of an error in the Commissioner's assessment, 
and that once shown, that the Commissioner should then have to 
show that on the balance of probabilities that the taxpayer's 
__,uc;,9--s v._:..... c.--1... f u..1 """" ~ .::__ k ~ assertion was wrong. r Q U 
,:.,_, "'/\' c... CA, l'->-, 1 C4. ~ , .... 
This by no means disregards the fact that there is no 
equity about a tax in itself, 103 but does point to equity in 
the method of determinat i on of that tax. Although the taxpayer 
should not be able to shield himself from liability to tax by 
the suggestion that an affirmative burden should rest upon the • }-:J ~r- ~ . . 
/ t--'; omm1ss1oner when his assessment is challenged, it does appear 
'. :J'- , reasonable that a taxpayer, on indicating an error in the 
~v / Commissioner's assessment, should be able to lead evidence i n { 
\ y with the final assessment determined ultimately on the / . -r balance of probabilities. Such a viewpoint does not interfere 
with the Commissioner's discretion in arriv ing at an amount upon 
which liability to tax i s assessed, but does pr e sent the taxpayer, 
on objection, with an opportunity to present the true state of his 
affairs to the extent that he considers t he Commissioner has not 
reached an appropriate assessment by means o f the assets accretion 
method. 
102. Supra n . 37 ; 872 . See also Lancaster ' s case , supra nn.91 , 94 . 
103 . See n . 54 , supra . 
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PART FIVE - PEER GROUP COMPARISON 
AND GROSS PERCENTAGE PROFIT METHODS. 
In making an assessment, the Commissioner may have regard 
to income that in ordinary circumstances would be expected to be 
declared by a particular taxpayer, or to expenses which such a 
taxpayer may ordinarily be expected to incur. 
Taxation Board of Review put it this way: 
In Case 9104 the 
It is, I suggest, inevitable that an inspector, confronted as 
he was in this case by an absence of records of certain aspects 
of the appellant's business, should of necessity make his 
calculations and estimates upon such information as he was able to 
garner from the evidence available to him, be it ever so slight. 
It was also, I think, proper that he should supplement or check 
results so obtained by making a comparison, wherever this could 
validly be done, with the results obtained in businesses of a 
105 similar nature. 
Although in Case 9 the inspector had considered businesses of a 
similar nature (i.e. the inspector had considered the records of 
a peer group), such a comparison may be made in respect of a 
hypothetical taxpayer in similar circumstances and of similar 
disposition. 106 For example, in Lancaster's case regard was 
given to "a hypothetical taxi driver operating in Tauranga", 
and in Fenson's Case;- 07 "the average living expenses of a person 
in the appellant's position". 
In respect of taxpayers in business, a peer group 
104 . (1961) 1 NZTBR 45 . 
105 . Ibid; 47 . 
106 . Supra n. 91; 596 . 
107. Supra n.74; 258 . 
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comparison is, in practice, generaly made on the basis of 
gross percentage profit i.e. the gross profit that may be 
expected to be returned by a similar taxpayer in a similar 
business. If the mater of expenses is also in issue, then regard 
may be had to expenditure normaly expected in such a (peer) 
business. This is particularly the case in assessments of 
t h . . 108 h l 109 d 'lk axpayers sue as taxiproprietors, ote owners an mi 
d lO h  h . . . bl d . ven ors were t e Commissioner is a e to con uct extensive 
investigations on the basis of the returns of similar taxpayers 
and on the basis of reports relating to the price structure 
operating within the particular business or to the known or 
accepted operating rates applicable within that type of 
business. In cases where the Commissioner cannot supplement 
or check the taxpayer's return or his assessment of the taxpayer's 
affairs by comparative means, then it would appear that he may 
calculate the gross percentage profit b y checking the taxpayer's 
source of supply and stock purchased, and deducting known e xpenses 
in the taxpayer's trading of "]: ..,~ ~ .. r.,.,..v .:,z- k- ~ 
.. }LA.'"\_ c.k f-D"-'t" ~ 
that stock within the income year. rt.. vJ.<.v -.J"-'] ~~ _,( ~-....-1(_ ,µv -~ ~,-JV fA._ (} ~/-1-f.,..._,.,•_.A f 1J I 
The peer group comparison and gross percentage profit 
methods have been accepted by the Court, the Taxation Review 
Board and Taxation Review Authority in the light of Turner J. 's 
t ' b ' I 111 t th ff t h th s atement in Ba ingtons case o e e ec tat e
Commissioner is not limited to any particular method o f assessment, 
108. E.g .  Case 9 (1968)  4 NZTBR 95, 101 where the inspector e xplained mile that " a rat e per /is the most cormno n  measure of revenu e in the 
t ransport indus try" and that "taxi revenu e is directly related to bu s iness mileage"; Case 28 (1967)  3 NZTBR 339; Case 40 (1974) 
5 NZTBR 391. See a lso Lancaster' s case, supra n .91. 
109.  E . g . Avey v Pascoe (1969) l  ATR 314, SC(NZ); Case 12 (1965 )  3  NZTBR 155;  Case 29 (1967) 3 NZTBR 346; Case 3 1 (1969) 4 NZTBR 341. 110.  E . G.  Macken v Frethey (1961 ) NZLR 245; Case 9 supra,  n.104. ll. Sup r a  n .53. 
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although he must act in good faith. 112 
As a result, in cases involving these methods, the 
evidence of departmental investigations, specialist witnesses, 
and investigations by parties other than the department has been 
held admissable where records are scarce or non-existent. 
Although the onus is on the taxpayer to show the Commissioner's 
assessment is wrong, the Commissioner's evidence must, however, 
relate to the individual taxpayer. 
stated: 
113 In Case 12 the Board 
In dealing with the question in other cases and in other 
situations, this Board has always adopted the view that, having 
regard to the variety of factors which may affect a percentage 
rate of gross profit, extreme care must be exercised in scrutinising 
evidence adduced as to the rate likely to be earned in any particular 
instance. 
d . C 9 114 an in ase : 
We agree that statistical information must be evaluate d with 
care. At the same time, we record our view that provided ... 
such information is collated with appropriate care and each 
facet thereof viewed ... as not being necessarily conclusive 
in itself but as providing a basis for conclusions ultimately 
reached in respect of the totality of the information available, 
that procedure must be regarded as unobjectionable. 
Income estimated by the peer group comparison or the gross 
percentage profit method may have been used in the acquisition 
112. E.g. Lancaster's c ase, s u pra, n. 91; Ca se 9, sup ra, n.10 4; Case 9, 
supra, n.108 ; Cas e 12 , s up r a ,n.109 ; Case 40 , sup ra,n.108 
113. Supra, n.1 09; 161. 
114. Supra, n.108; 104. 
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of assets. Further, the methods may be used to provide a check 
as to the acceptability of an assessment based on the assets 
accretion method. Also, a peer group comparison may indicate 
either an amount of deemed expenditure or assessable income 
within an assessment based on either the add-back or assets 
accretion methods. As a result the various methods are 
frequently used together, though subject to the qualification of 
the Board in Case 11115 to the effect that the Commissioner may 
not also calculate income by another method when that process 
could give rise to the assessment of tax on income not only in 
the year in which it is derived, but also in another year in which 
an asset arising out of such income becomes apparent. 
In light of the frequent comparability of taxpayers in 
both business and private spheres, and in light of the 
Commissioner not being limited to any particular method of 
assessment, the peer group comparison and gross percentage profit 
methods usually will be an effective tool in assessing a 
taxpayer's liability to tax. As in the case of the assets 
accretion method however, and accepting that the Commissioner 
should not bear the onus of proving matters which originate 
with the taxpayer and which are peculiarly within his knowledge 
and power, it seems reasonable that a taxpayer should have the 
opportunity of leading evidence, based upon another method of - -115. See s u pra, nn. 88 , 89. 
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assessment, in order to show the correct position of his 
affairs. ~,As--"' ,' k.o.. I ~ k J/v-v ~ 
~~ ~. 
In this respect, the citing of Turner J. 's dictum in 
Babington's case as authority for accepting the Commissioner's 
assessment save so far as that assessment is shown to be 
excessive, has been somewhat extended since 1957. This 
considerable handicap, explicitly laid upon the taxpayer by 
statute, limits the taxpayer on objection to challenging the 
results as assessed by the particular method the Commissioner 
has chosen. That handicap may be seen as providing the 
Commissioner's assessment with a rather excessive degree of 
protection. Further, it enables the Commissioner to assess tax 
at the higher figure of any alternative assessment. Although 
this is not necessarily the case his protected assessment may, 
however, misrepresent the affairs of a taxpayer as assessed by 
another method. It seems reasonable to test that alternative 
contention on the balance of probabilities. 
PART SIX - BUSINESS CONTROLLED BY NON-RESIDENTS: 
SECTION 22 ASSESSMENTS 
Under ection 22 of the Income Tax Act 1976 the 
Commissioner is authorised to arbitrarily make an assessment of 
income, or a determination of loss, where a business carried on 
in New Zealand is controlled by non-residents and appears to 
produce insufficient income or an excessive loss. 
The S ction is designed to combat transactions between 
affiliated companies operating in different countries but 
structured so that profits arise in countries with low tax rates, 
and the highest expenses of the companies concerned occur in 
high-tax jurisdictions116 (the practice of "transfer pricing"). 
Since expenses incurred in the production of assessable income 
are deductible, 117 the higher the expenses, the lower the amount 
of assessable income. In cases of reinvoicing, for example, the 
price of trading stock invoiced through an affiliated company 
in a low-tax jurisdiction is increased when shipped to the 
. h h . h . . d . . 118 1 company in t e ig -tax Juris iction. As a resu t expenses 
are higher in the high-tax jurisdiction and profits may be later 
distributed by the company in the low-tax jurisdiction (where the 
profit has been made) as a corporate dividend. 
116. E. g . Commissione r o f I n l a nd Reve nue v Eu ropa Oil NZ Ltd '(No . 1 )'[ 1976] 
NZLR 641, PC ; Europa Oil NZ Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Reve nue 
' (No . 2) 1 [1976) 1 NZLR 546 , PC . 
11 7. Section 104 . 
118 . E. g . Feder al Commissioner of Taxation v Isherwood & Dreyfus Pty Ltd 
(1979) 9 ATR 473 . 
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The Commissioner will make an assessment under Section 22 
then, when a New Zealand resident company makes excessive payments 
to a non-resident affiliate, or when a New Zealand resident 
company controlled by non-residents otherwise declares what he 
considers to be an insufficient income. 
The Commissioner must first look to see whether a 
business is carried on in New Zealand~19rf business is not carried 
on, then the Commissioner cannot make an assessment under 
Section 22. Secondly, he must establish that the business is 
controlled by non-residents~ 20The business must be controlled 
exclusively or principally by non-residents. If persons so 
controlling are residents, the Section does not apply. 
Alternatively the business may be carried on by a non-resident 
d h 1 f . d 121 f 
company or a company un er t e contro o non-res1 ents, or 
example, a New Zealand branch of a non-resident company or a 
New Zealand company controlled by non-residents. The third 
alternative is that the business may be carried on by persons 
122 having control of a non-resident company, for example, a 
New Zealand business carried on by persons having control of a 
foreign company. 
These prerequisites must be satisfied. Also, the 
Commissioner must be of the opinion that the business produces 
an insufficient assessable income or an excessiv e loss. 123 In 
119 . See s 22 (3) . 
120 . See s 22 (3) (a) . 
121. See s 22 (3) (b) . 
122 . See s 22 (3) (c ). 
1 23 . Sect ion 22(2) . 
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making an assessment of income the Commissioner bases his 
opinion on returns made to him and a consideration of what the 
Commissioner expects might be expected to arise from that /"'-----~---"-----....-------------business. He may then assess income on the basis of total 
receipts of the business (whether cash or credit) or as such 
proportion as he determines of the total purchase money payable 
in the conduct of the business (whether in cash or by the granting 
of credit) . 124 There is however, a safeguard against the 
possibility of double taxation. Amounts that are included 
in a return of any other person who is assessable for and liable 
to pay income tax on that amount are excluded from assessment 
under Section 22. 125 In respect of a loss, the Commissioner 
may determine the amount in such manner as he considers fair 
and reasonable. 126 
In an assessment under Section 22, the emphasis lies 
heavily upon the evaluative process, namely, whether the 
business may be assessed under the provisions therein. The 
Commissioner would therefore have regard to matters such as 
whether the business, i.e. "any profession, trade, manufacture 
or undertaking", is "carried on" in New Zealand: 127 whether it is 
carried on for "pecuniary profit": 128 whether the business is 
carried on by "non-residents'': 129 and whether the business is 
1 2 4. Idem. 
125. Sec t ion 22 (3 ) , proviso. 
1 26. Se ctio n 22 (4) . 
1 27. Se ction 22 (1 ) . 
128 . Idem. 
129 . Se ctio n s 22 (2 ) (b ) a nd 241. 
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"controlled" by non-residents. 130 
Quantifying the amount of assessable income or loss 
involves a further evaluative process, namely whether the charging 
provisions of the Act or provisions allowing deductions and 
. 
1 
In liqht of . . . exemptions app y. /tne mecfianics involved in the transfer pricing 
process, the Commissioner would usually be concerned with the 
applicability of ~ ction,,(o4 (and in the absence of applicability, 
the provisions of f action 99). In this respect the Commissioner 
will have regard to considerations such as whether payments for 
re-invoiced goods in fact have been made for trading stock or 
whether they have been made for the ultimate purpose of deriving 
tax-free dividends from a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and 
whether the inter-company arrangements or the affairs of the 
New Zealand business are part of an arrangement to avoid the 
liability to tax under the Income Tax Act 1976. 131 , 132 · 
130. Sections 22(2) (a) and 7. See also and compare Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation v Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd (1980) 11 ATR 42 
as to a consideration of the Australian equivalent of s 22 (3) (a). 
131. See Cecil Bros. Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1964) 111 
CLR 430 the Commissioner cannot attack the wisdom or amount of a 
payment in fact made for Trading Stock; Europa (No. 1), supra n. 116 -
deduction disallowed; Europa (No. 2), supra n. 116 - interposed 
company not for purpose of tax avoidance, deduction allowed therefore 
no tax avoidance; Isherwood & Dreyfus' case, supra n. 118 - dual 
purpose, deduction allowed; Halliwell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[1978) 1 NZLR 363 - trust arrangements not new source of income, 
arrangements void. 
132. Since this paper is concerned with the framework and the bases of the 
assessment, reference only has been made to matters of concern to the 
Commissioner in light of the actual provisions of s 22. For more 
detailed and technical analyses of s 22, and the cases referred to in 
nn. 116, 118, 130 and 131, see "Business Controlled by Non-residents" 
New Zealand Tax Planning Report No. 1-81 p. 6; "Taxation and 
Financial Planning for Companies" NZ Society of Accountants 1980 
- so -
Section 22 may therefore be seen as the equivalent to 
Section 19, in respect of the specific circumstances of 
businesses controlled by non-residents. In the absence of returns, 
a default assessment, in terms of Section 22, may be made under 
Section 21. Previous assessments of such businesses may be 
amended under Section 23, but when the circumstances specified 
in Section 22 apply, the Commissioner must consider the amount 
of assessable income or loss upon the bases set out in 
subsections (2) and (4) of Section 22 . In such circumstances an 
"arbitrary assessment" is called for, and the basis for such an 
assessment is provided for within Section 22. Time limits for 
amended assessments, as in Section 25, also apply. 
/ In determining 
/ Commissioner's opinion 
the quantum of assessable income, the 
relates to what might be expected to arise 
from that business. In arriving at his opinion it would appear 
that a comparative analysis may be made of the income or 
expenditure of similar businesses, or of businesses involved i n 
similar undertakings. I n making the actual assessment, however, 
there arises some compl i cation in applying a peer analy sis and 
indeed in directly adding-back the full amount which the 
Commissioner considers assessable. 
Pursuant to Section 22(2) the Commi ss i oner must make hi s 
Residenti a l Tax ation Seminar, T . W. Magney (Sydney) ; "Recognising 
a nd Tack l i n g Prob lems of Tax Plan n ing in International Trade, 
I nvestment, a nd Employment: a n Introductory Survey " , NZ Law Soc i ety 
Con fe r e nce April 1981, Dr . J . Prebble . 
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assessment either on the basis of total receipts or such 
proportion as he determines of the total purchase money paid or 
payable. "Total receipts'', however, must be taken to mean actual 
receipts. Where transactions have been entered into at less than 
arm's length however, the Commissioner cannot? assess more than ~ the actual receipts. Further, he has the discretion only to 
determine the percentage of the total purchase money paid or 
i..~,_.:)-, ~ payable. The provisions of Section 22 (2) do not give the ::,~a..-1 f 
Commissioner power to calculate either the correct price or 
the (deemed) receipts of the business for assessment purposes. 
It is clear that this is what the Legislature intended, but that 
discretion nevertheless, is not explicitly imposed upon the 
Commissioner. 
In making an assessment of loss, the Commissioner, in 
turning his mind to an amount fair and reasonable, may clearly 
have recourse to the methods of assessment as outlined in 
Parts Three, Four and Five of this paper. In most cases, 
however, since losses will be considered in light of expenses 
incurred, and to the extent to which they are permitted as 
reductions, assessment under Section 22(4) will usually involve 
the mere (procedural) adding back of amounts disallowed. 
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PART SEVEN - EVIDENCE 
It is clear that, except in proceedings on objection to an 
assessment, every& assessment and all the particulars thereof 
are conclusively deemed and taken to be correct, and that the 
liability to tax of the person so assessed is determined 
d . l 133 accor 1ng y. Further, that in such objection proceedings, the 
onus is on the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner is wrong and 
to what extent. 134 As Wilson J. noted in Glaussius' case 
however, the Commissioner may not disregard proof of the existence 
of an asset owned by the taxpayer during the period covered by the 
statement upon which the Commissioner bases his assessment, if the 
asset had not been brought into account in the statement and 
therefore tends to show that the statement and the (amended) 
t t . bl 135 assessmen s are erroneous o an ascertaina e extent. 
The onus on the taxpayer is on the balance o f 
b . 1 . . . b . 1 . . 13 6 h . t h t h 
pro abi 1t1es, not possi 1 1t1es. In t is respec owever, e 
demeanour and evidence of the taxpayer, and the availability o f 
corroborative evidence, may be decisive. The taxpayer's returns 
and the Commissioner's assessment must be considered in the light 
133. Sect i on 27 . 
134. Babington' s case , supra n . 37 ; Lancaste r' s case , s up ra n. 91 ; Le garth's 
c a se , s up r a n. 8 1; Mc c oard' s case , s upra n . 64; Glaussius ' case , 
s up r a n. 66 ; TRA Case 35 (1976) lTRNZ 537 , 545 ; TRA Case 12 (1980) 
4 TRNZ 1 01 , 119; TRA Case 17 , supr a n. 61 a t 179 . Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1974 , s 36 ; Income Ta x Act 1976 , ss 21 , 23 . 
135 . Supr a nn . 63, 80 . 
1 36 . See TRA Cas e 1 2 , Idem n . 134 , referring to Yew a nd Ors v 
Commi s s ioner of I nl and Revenue (1980) 4 TRNZ 59 , 63 . See Babingt o n 's 
c a se , s u p ra n. 37 ; McCoard ' s case , supra n . 64 ; Legarth' s c ase, 
s upra n . 81; Ou ggan' s cas e , s u p r a n. 81 , a t 684- 5 ; Lancas t e r' s 
case , s up ra n . 91, a t 591 . 
f h 1 . f . d 137 o t e tota ity o evi ence. As indicated in discussion 
relating to peer group and profit analyses in Part Five of this 
paper, care must be taken in accepting statistical evidence. 
Where it is properly obtained and relevant to the assessment, 
however, it will most likely be accepted. 137A The Commissioner 
however, is not estopped by statements made by himself or by 
his officers from making legally correct assessments. Indeed, 
it is his duty to do so. This is so whether the statements were 
or not correct at the time they were made and even though they A 
were made in good faith. 138 
It is also clear that in cases of prosecution under the 
I T At th . th . f 139 A t 
ncome ax c e onus is on e in ormant. n assessmen 
based on the assets accretion method may be admitted as evi denc e 
in respect of charges of the wilful making of false returns of 
income,but it is not conclusive against the taxpayer. 140 However, 
on prosecution the assessment must be subject to examination, and 
137. E.g. Maxwell's case sup ra n. 1 2 ; Le garth' s cas e , s up r a n . 81; 
Case 18, supra n. 63; TRA Case 17 sup ra n.56 . Verte lrna n v 
Inland Revenue Commissione r (NZ) (1 970 ) 1 ATR 447 , 449 . 
137A. Se e supra, p . 43. 
138. TRA Case 24 (1978 ) 2 TRNZ 501 , 510 ; Ronell v Feder al Commi s s i on e r 
of Taxation (1978) 8 ATR 411, 41 2 . 
139. See Bry an v Inland Revenue Departme nt (1980) 4 TRNZ 183 , 184- 5 ; 
Hall's case, sup ra n. 70 . 
1 40. Maxwell's c a se , s upra n. 12 ; Gideon Trading Co Lt d v Commissioner 
o f Inland Revenue [196 1) NZLR 440 ; Ha ll ' s case , s up r a n. 70 . 
~·,'<7 GBRARY 
'1CTORI~ u.11vrn~11Y Of v/EL LINGHl l\ 
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any hearsay evidence, particularly where a peer group comparison 
or gross percentage profit method has been used, may not be 
admitted where corroborative evidence is not available. 141 The 
fact that the various methods may not show the exact extent of 
understatement of income is not fatal in criminal proceedings. 
As Moller J. noted at 185 in Bryan's case in respect of the use 
of the assets accretion method to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, 
that returns were both false and wilfully false: 
In Hall's case Wilson J. said: 
"The theoretical basis, for employing this method is that, by means 
of it, the taxpayer's expenditure in a given year is ascertained with 
substantial accuracy and, when allowance is made for the taxpayer's 
receipts from non-assessable sources (such as loans and gifts), the 
balance must, perforce, represent assessable income. Provided the 
facts are accurately found, this theory is logically sound." 
And in Vuleta's case Henry J. said at 329: 
"The question always is what inferences can safely be drawn from the 
proved facts. If the evidence satisfactorily eliminates all possible 
sources from which the taxpayer might increase his assets other than 
his business activities, and, if any explanation otherwise by him is 
properly rejected, then a tribunal of fact may well reach a conclusion 
beyond reasonable doubt that the source of the increase was undisclosed 
transactions in the nature of his known business." 
Finally it is suggested in Molloy on Income Tax at 513, that it may well 
be proper to resort to the "assets accretion" method where "the records 
have been lost, or are unsatisfactory." 
(Emphasis added.) 
and further, at 188 (in respect of the inspector's evidence 
relating to his comparison of a number of other similar taxpayers 
141. Maxwell's case, supra n. 12 at 131; Buckley v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (1962) NZLR R29 , 34,CA; Avey v Pascoe , supra n. 
109 at 315. Bryan's case, supra n. 139 at 188. 
within the same area and relating to New Zealand statistics 
available from the Department of Statistics) / Moller J. was 
prepared to have held that the figures were hearsay since it 
was not possible to cross-examine and test their validity, nor 
was it evidence of an expert witness: 142 
It is true that evidence as to "gross p rofi t percentages" 
was accepted in Avey v Pascoe (1969) 1 ATR 314. But, in 
that case, a particular witness with personal knowledge of 
the situation was called to give evidence on the sub j ect o f 
the percentages obtained b y other business e s of the same kind 
in the area, and the evidence of the dep artmental officer was 
in respect of his own personal investigations i nto the taxation 
ff . f h . . 1 b . 143 a airs o sue simi ar usinesses. 
In criminal proceedings, each offence must be established 
. . . . . 144 in relation to each income year to which the prosecution relates. 
In all cases the Commissioner is under a statutory duty to make 
an assessment in respect of every taxpayer for every year, and may 
145 otherwise amend an assessment to ensure the correctness thereof. 
In doing so, however, he must have regard to the facts of each 
case and realistically assess the income for each year. Since this 
may involve a spreading of income over a number o f years, the 
allocation of income to particular years must reflect a credible 
f h h d h k ff . . t d 14 6 assessment o t e taxpayer a e ept su icien recor s. 
14 2 . I n t he circumstances the evidence was not essential to the 
deci sion . 
14 3 . See also Buckley ' s case , supra . n . 141 ; 29 - persons giving 
eviden ce had no personal involvement in the accounting 
sys t e m o f the taxpayer . 
144 . Hal l ' s case , supra . n . 26 ; 187 
145 . Section 19 a n d default assessment under s . 21 . 
146 . See par t Four of this page , P . 32 & ff . 
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In light of the statutory provisions relating to 
assessments and determinations and in light of the authority 
of Babington v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, it can only be 
emphasised that ordinarily the taxpayer cannot challenge the 
validity of the method which the Commissioner, in good faith, 
has chosen to use, and that the taxpayer has the considerable 
burden of showing that the Commissioner's assessment is wrong, 
and to what extent. Further, in criminal proceedings, although 
the taxpayer may challenge the assessment, the results of the 
method by which that assessment was made may be used in evidence 
against him. In matters of evidence then, considerable attention 
is focused on the Commissioner's initial assessment. As argued 
throughout this paper, it would seem desirable that the taxpayer 
have the opportunity, as early in the course of events as 
possible, to test the validity of the Commissioner's assessment, 
on the balance of probabilities, by producing evidence of his 
affairs assessed by a method other than that the Commissioner has 
adhered to. 
PART EIGHT - CONCLUSIONS 
The statutory provisions relating to assessments and 
determinations provide the Commissioner with the framework within 
which he may require any~ nformation that is necessary and 
which is obtainable, for the assessment of a taxpayer's liability 
to tax. Furthermore, in also providing for the act of assessment, 
the L gislative framework provides the Commissioner with the 
discretion as to how he makes an assessment in relation to each 
taxpayer. 
Where the Commissioner rejects the taxpayer's returns 
and makes an assessment using the methods of quantification as 
outlined in this paper, his assessment, as in all other cases, 
is deemed correct, except on objection. In light of the 
Commissioner's discretion as to method, the support given to 
that discretion in (and by the subsequent acceptance of the 
146 authority of) Babington v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, and 
in light of the acceptance of investigation reports not necessaril1 
prepared by the Inland Revenue Department and which may relate 
to a class of taxpayer far beyond the resources of the taxpayer 
to consider, the onus on the taxpayer to show that the 
Commissioner's assessment is wrong, and by how much, may indeed 
prove considerable. 
1 46 . s up ra. n. 37 
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A solution may be seen in the decision of Gauci & Masi v 
F d 1 C · · f . 14 7 h . e era omrnissioner o Taxation were Barwick C.J. 
considered s 190 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
which is almost identical to section 36 of the Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1974. In considering whether land had been acquired 
for the purpose of profit - making by sale, Barwick C.J. held that 
if there is no material upon which it may properly be concluded 
that the property was acquired with the relevant purpose, the 
assessment is thereby shown to be excessive. The Commissioner 
could not deem such a purpose in the absence of appropriate 
evidence, despite the onus on the taxpayer to show that the 
. 148 amount was excessive. 
In the same case, Mason J., in his dissenting judgment 
149 adhered to the explicit onus on the taxpayer as follows: 
The Act does not place any onus on the Commissioner to show that 
the assessments were correctly made. Nor is there any statutory 
requirement that the assessments should be sustained or supported 
by evidence. The implication of such a requirement would be 
inconsistent with s 190(b) for it is a consequence of that provision 
that unless the appellant shows by evidence that the assessment is 
incorrect, it will prevail. 
The approach of Barwick C.J. was rejected in the later 
Australian decision of McCormack v Federal Commissioner of 
T t · 15 O h h . . f 11 d M J . G . axa ion were t e maJority o owe ason . in auci. It 
has also been rejected by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
147. (1975) 2 ATR 672, HC 
148. Ibid, 675. 
149. Ibid, 676 
150. (1979) 9 ATR 610 
Williams Property Developments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue 151 where the taxpayer specially raised the Gauci decision 
152 and Barwick C.J. 's approach. 
As P.L. Reddy in an article in (1981) 11 VUWLR 125, 150 
submits~5lt may be a fairer approach, particularly in discretion 
cases, as follows: 
The objector must have evidence supporting his assertion that, in 
his case, the Commissioner should have exercised his discretion 
differently. If this evidence prima facie supports a different 
result, the Commissioner should then be required to justify his 
own conclusion. If the discretion in question gives the Commissioner 
the power to determine the amount of tax to be paid, then the 
taxpayer should not be required to show by how much the Commissioner's 
assessment is wrong. Once prima facie evidence of an error is shown, 
it should be for the Commissioner to show that his assessment was 
correct. 
[Footnote 
This approach gains some support from Walker v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [1963] NZLR 339, which suggests that the Commissioner must 
be able to bring evidence to show that his assessment is reasonable , 
and not arbitrary. See also the Court of Appeal decision in Lowe v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1981) 5 NZTC 61006; 4 TRNZ 233, where 
Cooke and Richardson JJ intimated that in some cases the Commissioner's 
assessment might fail because he had not passed the "threshold" of 
providing a proper and intelligible assessment. This may provide 
something of a halfway house between the very restrictive traditional 
approach more appropriate in the assets discretion cases, and that 
ill-fated Barwick approach]. 
151. (1980) 3 NZTR 513. 
152. See Ibid 518 (Richardson P. and Woodhouse J.). 
153. "objecting to discretionary determinations by the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue" 
The approach suggested by Ms Reddy accords with the 
submissions in the text of this paper. On such a viewpoint, the 
Commissioner's assessment still would be deemed correct, except 
in proceedings on objection where evidence produced by the 
taxpayer supporting a different result, achieved by a different 
method of calculation, could be considered on the balance of 
probabilities. This does not mean that the onus to show that 
the Commissioner is wrong should shift from the taxpayer. It 
does mean however, that (a) the taxpayer should not be required 
to show by how much the Commissioner's assessment is wrong, 
and (b) that the Commissioner should justify his conclusion in 
the face of that evidence. 
Such a less restrictive approach to the onus of proof 
and to evidence which may be adduced by a taxpayer in support 
of his objection to an assessment may not only provide the 
opportunity for the taxpayer to produce such evidence, but may 
also provide the Taxation Review Authority and the Courts with 
a more detailed picture of the taxpayer's income and expenditure. 
Furthermore, such an approach may allow for more effective 
dialogue between the Commissioner and the taxpayer during the 
actual process of assessment. It is acknowledged that the 
Commissioner extensively enters into discussions during the 
course of his investigations, but in the present circumstances 
the onus lies on the taxpayer to prove the Commissioner wrong, 
and by how much, should there be no agreement as to method or 
quantum of assessment. 
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Such a viewpoint, as has been argued in this paper, 
indicates the necessity for judicial re-consideration of 
Babington's case and the subsequent cases in which Babington 
has received support. This may be achieved in light of the 
wording of the present provisions of the Income Tax Act 1976 
and the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974, but in light of the 
support given to Turner J. 's dictum in Babington and in light 
of the reluctance of the Courts to adopt a less restrictive 
approach to the onus of proof, Legislative amendment clearly 
embodying the above submissions would seem to be the only 
solution. 
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